Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) safety modelling applied to an aircraft rapid decompression event

Abstract Understanding a crew’s response to a rapid decompression, and factors which can influence the decisions crew members make, can facilitate a safe resolution of a potentially life threatening hazard. Anticipating the Human Factors issues is an appropriate way to assess potential risk factors before such an event happens. The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) and its predictive risk assessment method, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), is a systemic approach to safety analysis. This approach is ideal when considering complex systems, such as aviation. The scenario of an aircraft experiencing a decompression event was analysed using STAMP-STPA across a series of workshops during which key safety elements were identified and reflected upon. It was found that the use of the STAMP-STPA methodology successfully identified factors central to the Helios 522 accident. Based on the outputs of this research, it is suggested that, due to its inherent utility, the STAMP-STPA method can be used to elicit a variety of safety critical insights, and does so in a way that considers individuals, organisations and technology at the same level of granularity, in a way that does not attribute blame to any single agent.

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