Why States Act through Formal International Organizations

States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. IOs as community representatives further allow states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments.

[1]  Barry R. Weingast,et al.  Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[2]  Susan Strange.  Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis , 1982, International Organization.

[3]  J. Fearon.  Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes , 1994, American Political Science Review.

[4]  S. Brechin,et al.  Bridging the gap: international organizations as organizations , 1988, International Organization.

[5]  S. Weber.  Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development , 1994, International Organization.

[6]  Barry R. Weingast,et al.  7. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market , 2019 .

[7]  A. Chayes,et al.  The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements , 1995 .

[8]  David M. Rocke,et al.  Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation , 1996 .

[9]  Shorey Peterson,et al.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property. , 1933 .

[10]  P. Haas.  Knowledge, power, and international policy coordination , 1997 .

[11]  D. Snidal.  Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes , 1985, American Political Science Review.

[12]  S. Schneebaum.  The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements , 1995 .

[13]  I. Shihata,et al.  The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development , 1990 .

[14]  Friedrich Kratochwil,et al.  International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state , 1986, International Organization.

[15]  Peter M. Haas,et al.  Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. , 1996 .

[16]  H. Demsetz,et al.  Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization , 1975, IEEE Engineering Management Review.

[17]  I. Crawford.  Beyond the nation-state , 1992, Nature.

[18]  Kenneth W. Abbott.  The Many Faces of International Legalization , 1998, Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting.

[19]  Charles L. Glaser.  Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help , 1996 .

[20]  J. Trachtman.  The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis , 1997 .

[21]  Inis L. ClaudeJr.  Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations , 1988 .

[22]  Itai Sened,et al.  Explaining social institutions , 1996 .

[23]  W. Dugger.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[24]  C. Hill,et al.  Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions and political change , 1994 .

[25]  J. M. Rochester.  The rise and fall of international organization as a field of study , 1986, International Organization.

[26]  M. Barnett.  Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System , 1993 .

[27]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant , 1990 .

[28]  Duncan Snidal,et al.  The Game Theory of International Politics , 1985, World Politics.

[29]  Kenneth W. Abbott.  GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond , 1992 .

[30]  Kenneth W. Abbott,et al.  'Trust But Verify:' The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements , 1993 .

[31]  W. Mattli,et al.  Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration , 1993, International Organization.

[32]  O. Williamson,et al.  The mechanisms of governance , 1996 .

[33]  F. Caron,et al.  New forms of international cooperation , 1999 .

[34]  Alexander Wendt,et al.  Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics , 1992, International Organization.

[35]  A. Safarian,et al.  Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries , 1985 .

[36]  M. Finnemore,et al.  National Interests in International Society , 1996 .

[37]  Lisa L. Martin.  Coercive Cooperation , 1992 .

[38]  Jérome Slater.  The Organization of American States and the Dominican Crisis , 1969 .

[39]  K. Thompson,et al.  Politics Among Nations , 1948 .

[40]  Todd Sandler,et al.  On the Economic Theory of Alliances , 1975 .

[41]  Frederic L. Kirgis.  International organizations in their legal setting , 1993 .

[42]  Friedrich Kratochwil,et al.  The State of the Art on the Art of the State , 1986 .

[43]  A. Moravcsik.  Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community , 1991, International Organization.

[44]  P. Haas.  Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination , 1992, International Organization.

[45]  Oran R. Young,et al.  International Governance , 1994 .

[46]  Alexander Wendt.  Constructing International Politics , 1995 .

[47]  J. Ferejohn.  Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England , 2000 .

[48]  M. Marrese.  CMEA: effective but cumbersome political economy , 1986, International Organization.

[49]  Raymond F. Mikesell,et al.  The World Bank in a Changing World , 1963 .

[50]  Ronald B. Mitchell,et al.  Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance , 1994, International Organization.

[51]  Bruce Russett,et al.  The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85 , 1998, International Organization.

[52]  I. Head,et al.  Principles of Public International Law , 1967 .

[53]  A. Stein.  Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world , 1982, International Organization.

[54]  D. Snidal.  Political economy and international institutions , 1996 .

[55]  D. Kennedy.  The Move to Institutions , 1987 .

[56]  William J. Drake,et al.  Ideas, interests, and institutionalization: “trade in services” and the Uruguay Round , 1992, International Organization.

[57]  J. D. Morrow.  Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information , 1994, International Organization.

[58]  N. Blokker,et al.  International Institutional Law:Unity Within Diversity , 1972 .

[59]  Kenneth A. Oye.  Cooperation under Anarchy , 1986 .

[60]  C. Mcneely,et al.  Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action , 1995 .