Reward patterns of fair solutions

Abstract The solutions proposed in the literature on fair allocations are sensitive to the preference profiles of the agents. As a consequence, each of them displays a specific distribution pattern which may be interpreted as rewarding certain kinds of preferences at the expense of others. In the basic models with private goods and decreasing returns, the Equal Income Competitive Equilibrium tends to favor the eccentric preferences, whereas most egalitarian-equivalent solutions tend to reward the agents who like particular resources. The identification of the rewarding pattern of each mechanism sheds light on its ethical content, and may help select the adequate solution in concrete applications. In this analysis, a Preference Monotonicity property turns out to be satisfied by many solutions.

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