Partially-Speci ed Large Games

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a di¢ culty in applying it to games which are not fully speci…ed. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-

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