Group Identities and Individual Influence: Reconstructing the Theory of Interest Groups

Public-choice models argue that large interest groups are less likely to overcome free-rider problems because of the irrelevance of individual's participation to the supply of non-excludable group benefits. But these accounts are constructed in terms of ‘objective’ variables, and hence rely on perfect information assumptions. Paying attention instead to how people learn that interest groups are relevant for them indicates a key role for group identities, i.e. subjective perceptions of interests shared with others. Recasting the decision to form or join groups in terms of subjective variables highlights the imporlance of perceived group viability. In a liberal democratic context, increasing group size has ambiguous effects; it somewhat accentuates the irrelevance of individual participation to supply, and yet (ceteris paribus) also increases (he group's viability. Applying the group identity approach sheds light on a problem which public-choice theory cannot adequately explain: the reasons why (apart from group size) social interests are differentially difficult or easy to organize.

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