A Dynamic Bayesian Security Game Framework for Strategic Defense Mechanism Design

In many security problems, service providers are basically unaware of the type of their clients. The client can potentially be an attacker who will launch an attack at any time during their connections to service providers. Our main goal is to provide a general framework for modeling security problems subject to different types of clients connected to service providers. We develop an incomplete information two-player game, to capture the interaction between the service provider (i.e., the server) and an unknown client. In particular, we consider two types of clients, i.e., attacker and benign clients. We analyze the game using perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) with different conditions. We finally design an algorithm using the computed PBNE strategy profiles to find the best defense strategy.

[1]  John S. Baras,et al.  Decision and Game Theory for Security , 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

[2]  Ehab Al-Shaer,et al.  A game-theoretic approach for deceiving Remote Operating System Fingerprinting , 2013, 2013 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS).

[3]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games , 2008, AAMAS.

[4]  Tansu Alpcan,et al.  Security Games with Incomplete Information , 2009, 2009 IEEE International Conference on Communications.

[5]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Game theory (3. pr.) , 1991 .

[6]  Dong Zhou,et al.  Translation techniques in cross-language information retrieval , 2012, CSUR.

[7]  Quanyan Zhu,et al.  Game theory meets network security and privacy , 2013, CSUR.

[8]  Cristina Comaniciu,et al.  A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks , 2006, GameNets '06.

[9]  Peng Liu,et al.  Using Signaling Games to Model the Multi-step Attack-Defense Scenarios on Confidentiality , 2012, GameSec.

[10]  Martin J. Osborne,et al.  An Introduction to Game Theory , 2003 .

[11]  Carlos Cid,et al.  Are We Compromised? Modelling Security Assessment Games , 2012, GameSec.

[12]  Niki Pissinou,et al.  Modeling cooperative, selfish and malicious behaviors for Trajectory Privacy Preservation using Bayesian game theory , 2013, 38th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks.

[13]  Milind Tambe,et al.  Security and Game Theory: IRIS – A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks , 2011, AAMAS 2011.

[14]  Bo An,et al.  Security Games Applied to Real-World: Research Contributions and Challenges , 2013, Moving Target Defense.

[15]  Yang Xiao,et al.  Game Theory for Network Security , 2013, IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials.