How language relates to belief, desire, and emotion understanding

Abstract Two experiments examined syntax and semantics as correlates of theory-of-mind (ToM). In Experiment 1 children’s language was examined at 3 years of age in relation to ToM at 3, 3.5, 4, and 5.5 years. Semantics predicted unique variance in later belief understanding but not desire understanding. Syntax did not explain unique variance in belief or desire. In Experiment 2 two measures of syntax and a measure of semantics were used with 65 3–5-year-olds. The syntax measures tested children’s understanding of word order and embedded clauses. They were related to false belief, but contrary to some predictions, were also related to emotion recognition. Performance on language control tasks with low syntactic demands correlated equally well with false belief. In both experiments performance on the syntax and semantics tasks was highly inter-correlated. We argue that ToM is related to general language ability rather than syntax or semantics per se.

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