Solving sybil attacks using evolutionary game theory

Recommender systems have become quite popular recently. However, such systems are vulnerable to several types of attacks that target user ratings. One such attack is the Sybil attack where an entity masquerades as several identities with the intention of diverting user ratings. In this work, we propose evolutionary game theory as a possible solution to the Sybil attack in recommender systems. After modeling the attack, we use replicator dynamics to solve for evolutionary stable strategies. Our results show that under certain conditions that are easily achievable by a system administrator, the probability of an attack strategy drops to zero implying degraded fitness for Sybil nodes that eventually die out.

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