Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology

Publisher Summary Evidential probability (EP) offers an account of the impact of statistical evidence on single-case probability. Observed frequencies of repeatable outcomes determine a probability interval that can be associated with a proposition. This chapter introduces objective Bayesian epistemology (OBE), a theory of how evidence helps determine appropriate degrees of belief. OBE might be thought of as a rival to the evidential probability approaches. The theory of evidential probability is motivated by two basic ideas: probability assessments should be based upon relative frequencies, to the extent that one knows them, and the assignment of probability to specific individuals should be determined by everything that is known about that individual. This chapter also concerns with developing some machinery to perform uncertain reasoning in second-order evidential probability.

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