Most serious asymmetric cryptosystems proposed in the last couple of years have been provided with a proof of security (which may or may not use the random oracle model or the generic group model) and no serious attacks have been found against these algorithms in the mathematical setting. This has led to an increase in the use of side-channel attacks. A side-channel is a method with which an attacker might gain more information about a cryptosystem via the practical substantiation of the theoretical model. Popular side-channels include timing analysis, power analysis, electro-magnetic radiation analysis and error message attacks. We will consider only the models that allow side-channel attacks, not the practical means in which they might be implemented. For example we recognize that power analysis is a very powerful tool in the arsenal of the attacker however we will consider the ways in which power analysis might be used (such as in Hamming weight attacks, see section 3) but not power analysis directly.
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