The Dynamics of Public Support for Coalition Governments

This article investigates the relationship between economic conditions and party support for coalition parties in Denmark and the Netherlands. The article argues that the simple reward-punishment model cannot fully account for changes in citizens' support for parties, given variable economic performance. Using aggregate public support data for political parties, the article shows that citizens differentiate between coalition partners depending on the parties' issue priorities. Instead of blaming or rewarding all coalition parties in a uniform fashion, citizens shift support from one coalition party to another, depending on the perceived competence of a party to deal with particular economic problems. The article finds that the structure of responsibility in parliamentary democracies ruled by coalition governments is more complex than is often assumed. Therefore, it is argued that students of economics and public opinion should pay particular attention to the institutional context in which citizens make choices.

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