The Paradox of Priority

There is a paradox in bank mergers. On average, bank mergers do not create value, yet they continue to occur. Using cross-sectional analysis to examine 54 bank mergers announced between 1991 and 1995, I test several facets of focus and diversification. Upon announcement, the market rewards the mergers of partners that focus their geography and activities and earnings streams. Only one of these facets, focusing earnings streams, enhances long-term performance. Two other circumstances improve long-term performance: when a merger involves a relatively inefficient acquirer and when partners reduce bankruptcy costs.

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