Environmental compliance: The good, the bad, and the super green.

Although many empirical studies have examined firms' decisions to participate in voluntary environmental programs, relatively few have examined why firms choose different levels of compliance with environmental regulations. This paper uses primary data to examine why some firms violate regulatory standards on water pollution, solid waste, toxic and hazardous waste, and hazardous air emissions, while others over-comply with them. The results suggest that different factors drive decisions to violate or over-comply with an environmental regulation. Some evidence was found to support the strategic behavior theory of environmental overcompliance, but no corroborating evidence was uncovered to support the green consumer theory.

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