Non-interference through Determinism

The standard approach to the specification of a secure system is to present a (usually state-based) abstract security model separately from the specification of the system's functional requirements, and establishing a correspondence between the two specifications. This complex treatment has resulted in development methods distinct from those usually advocated for general applications.

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