Design and implementation of cast-as-intended verifiability for a blockchain-based voting system

Digitization of electoral processes depends on confident systems that produce verifiable evidence. The design and implementation of voting systems has been widely studied in prior research, bringing together expertise in many fields. Switzerland is organized in a federal, decentralized structure of independent governmental entities. Thus, its decentralized structure is a real-world example for implementing an electronic voting system, where trust is distributed among multiple authorities. This work outlines the design and implementation of a blockchain-based electronic voting system providing cast-as-intended verifiability. The generation of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge enables every voter to verify the encrypted vote, while maintaining the secrecy of the ballot. The Public Bulletin Board (PBB) is a crucial component of every electronic voting system, serving as a publicly verifiable log of communication and ballots - here a blockchain is used as the PBB. Also, the required cryptographic operations are in linear relation to the number of voters, making the outlined system fit for large-scale elections.

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