Strategy Proof and Privacy Preserving Fair Allocation Mechanism

We study a fair division problem with indivisible objects such as jobs, houses and one divisible good like money. It is required that each agent be assigned with exactly one object and a certain amount of money. Agents are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities in money but their reservation values over the objects are private information. A dynamic mechanism is proposed that induces all agents to act honestly rather than strategically and assigns the objects with money to agents efficiently and fairly; at the same time it achieves privacy protection for the agents.

[1]  Z. Yang,et al.  An Intersection Theorem on an Unbounded Set and Its Application to the Fair Allocation Problem , 2001 .

[2]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Equity - in theory and practice , 1994 .

[3]  Enriqueta Aragones,et al.  A derivation of the money Rawlsian solution , 1995 .

[4]  H. Kuhn.  The Hungarian method for the assignment problem , 1955 .

[5]  William Thomson,et al.  NO-ENVY AND CONSISTENCY IN ECONOMIES WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS , 1991 .

[6]  Ning Sun,et al.  A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism , 2003 .

[7]  Eric Maskin.  On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods , 1987 .

[8]  Lars-Gunnar Svensson.  Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages , 2004 .

[9]  E. H. Clarke.  Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[10]  P. Hall.  On Representatives of Subsets , 1935 .

[11]  H. Leonard.  Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[12]  Lawrence M. Ausubel.  An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects , 2004 .

[13]  Shinji Ohseto.  Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods , 2006 .

[14]  Mamoru Kaneko,et al.  The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity , 1986 .

[15]  V. Crawford,et al.  Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers , 1981 .

[16]  Zaifu Yang,et al.  Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements , 2006 .

[17]  P. Reny,et al.  An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction , 2005 .

[18]  Hervé Moulin,et al.  Fair division and collective welfare , 2003 .

[19]  Faruk Gul,et al.  WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH GROSS SUBSTITUTES , 1999 .

[20]  D. Gale,et al.  Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice , 1991 .

[21]  Gerard van der Laan,et al.  Existence and Welfare Properties of Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Multiple Divisible and Indivisible Commodities and Linear Production Technologies , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[22]  Lars-Gunnar Svensson,et al.  Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods , 1984 .

[23]  Lars-Gunnar Svensson.  Large Indivisibles: An analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness , 1983 .

[24]  D. Gale,et al.  Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[25]  F. Su.  Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division , 1999 .

[26]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[27]  Shinji Ohseto,et al.  Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation , 2005, Math. Soc. Sci..

[28]  Flip Klijn,et al.  An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money , 2000, Soc. Choice Welf..

[29]  Matthias G. Raith,et al.  Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems , 2002, Soc. Choice Welf..

[30]  Akiyoshi Shioura,et al.  EFFICIENT STRATEGY PROOF FAIR ALLOCATION ALGORITHMS , 2006 .