Limitations of state estimation based cyber attack detection schemes in industrial control systems

An experiment was conducted on a water treatment plant to investigate the effectiveness of using Kalman filter based attack detection schemes in a Cyber Physical System (CPS). Kalman filter was implemented with Chi-Square detector. Random, stealthy bias, and replay attacks were launched and results analysed. Analysis indicates that stealthy false data injection and replay attacks cannot be detected by legacy failure detection methods.

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