Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games

MC-nets constitute a natural compact representation scheme for cooperative games in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the complexity of several natural computational problems that concern solution concepts such as the core, the least core and the nucleolus. We characterize the complexity of these problems for a variety of subclasses of MC-nets, also considering constraints on the game such as superadditivity (where appropriate). Many of our hardness results are derived from a hardness result that we establish for a class of multi-issue cooperative games (SILT games); we suspect that this hardness result can also be used to prove hardness for other representation schemes.

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