Strategic Generation Investment Using a Complementarity Approach

This paper provides a methodology to assist a strategic producer in making informed decisions on generation investment. A single target year is considered with demand variations modeled through blocks. The strategic behavior of the producer is represented through a bilevel model: the upper-level considers both investment decisions and strategic production actions and the lower-level corresponds to market clearing. Prices are obtained as dual variables of power balance equations. Rival uncertainties (on offering and investment) are characterized through scenarios. The resulting model is a large-scale mixed-integer LP problem solvable using currently available branch-and-cut techniques. Results pertaining to an illustrative example and a case study are reported and discussed.

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