Computation and cognition

In this paper I look at three theories regarding the exact nature of cognitive state transitions. I briefly dismiss dynamic systems theory as providing no clearly specified explananda consistent with notions of cognition. For remainder of the paper, I focus upon ‘classical’ cognitive science and dynamic computationalism. I present and criticize the two most prominent arguments in the literature. I suggest that proponents of each of these arguments in the literature misunderstand or misapply the technical notions to which they appeal. I conclude the paper by arguing that properly understood, all the types of arguments in the literature support dynamic computationalism.

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