The (null) effects of exposure to disparagement humor on stereotypes and attitudes

Three experiments tested whether exposure to disparaging humor would produce either more extreme stereotypes and attitudes or more accessible stereotypes and attitudes concerning the disparaged group. In the experimental conditions, participants were exposed to disparaging humor about men (Experiments l and 2) or lawyers (Experiment 3). In the control conditions, participants were exposed to nondisparaging humor (all three experiments), nonhumorous disparaging Information (Experiments 2 and 3) or nothing at all (Experiments 2 and 3). Dependent measures included ratings of the target group on Stereotypie attributes, attitudes toward the target group, Interpretation ofambiguous behaviors performed by members of the target group, and latencies of Stereotypie and attitudinal judgments about the target group. Across the three experiments, a total of83 analyses yieldedonly l difference in the predicted direction. Simply put, exposure to disparaging humor had no demonstrable effects on stereotype or attitude extremity or accessibility, in contrast to the common belief that such humor has a powerful impact. Disparagement humor is defined s humorous material in which one party is victimized, belittled, or suffers some misfortune or act of aggression (Zillman 1983). Sexist and racist jokes exemplify this category of humor. Humor theorists have proposed that we sometimes enjoy seeing others victimized. For example, Freud (1905 [I960]) believed that one important function of humor is that it allows the expression of aggressive and hostile feelings in a socially acceptable manner (called "tendentious" humor in bis theory). Gr ner went so far s to argue that "ridicule is the basic component of all humorous material" (1978: 14). Humor 12-2 (1999), 195-219 0933-1719/99/012-0195 © Walter de Gruyter 196 /. M. Olson, G. R. Maio, and K. L. Hobden Researchers have investigated factors that predict enjoyment of disparagement humor. For example, the "dispositional theory" (Zillman and Cantor 1976) assumes that individuals enjoy a disparaging joke more when they have negative attitudes toward the victimized party (e.g., when the joke belittles a disliked outgroup) and/or positive attitudes toward the agent of disparagement (e.g., when the agent is from the ingroup). Several studies have supported this model (e.g., LaFave et al. 1974; Wicker et al. 1980). In the present research, we investigated the effects of disparagement humor. This topic has received very little attention. In one relevant study, Hobden and Olson (1994) tested whether freely telling disparaging jokes about a target group might generate less favorable attitudes toward that group. Participants read disparaging jokes about lawyers into a tape recorder under conditions of either high or low choice. Participants in the high choice condition subsequently expressed less favorable evaluations of lawyers than did participants in the low choice condition. These Undings suggest that telling disparaging jokes can be the source of dissonance-motivated attitude change, producing more negative attitudes toward the target of the jokes (see also Maio et al. 1996). But what about simple exposure to disparagement humor? Does hearing or reading disparaging jokes and cartoons have any effects on stereotypes and attitudes? Judging from the furor generated by such comedians äs Andrew "Dice" Clay, many individuals and groups believe that exposure to racist or sexist humor perpetuates and strengthens stereotypes. Yet, to our knowledge, this issue has not been examined in previous experimental research. Disparagement humor and stereotype change Disparagement humor can be directed at many groups, including ethnic, religious, gender, and occupational groups. Typically, these cartoons and jokes play on negative stereotypes about the groups. One possible consequence of exposure to disparagement humor is that the audience's stereotypes will change to become more consistent with the negative Information in the joke. Why might exposure to disparaging jokes produce stereotype change? First, exposure to any assertion tends to increase its judged validity (Gilbert et al. 1990), perhaps because familiär ideas are assumed to Disparagement humor 197 have some truth value. Second, humor might inhibit counterarguing. Disparagement humor usually involves content that would be met with hostility and counterargument if it were conveyed in a serious fashion. Yet, because the context is not serious, listeners may be less likely to counterargue the sentiments expressed in disparaging jokes. Also, the positive affect generated by humor might directly inhibit counterarguing (see Mackie and Worth 1989). Finally, self-perception processes (Bern 1972; Olson 1992) might produce stereotype change. For example, if listeners laugh at a disparaging joke, they might infer from their own reaction that the humor contains a "kernel of truth." Disparagement humor and stereotype accessibility Even if exposure to disparaging humor does not produce changes in stereotypes, it might make stereotypes more accessible in listeners' minds. Accessibility can be defined äs the ease with which Information comes to mind, i.e., the activation potential of available knowledge (Higgins 1996). To understand disparagement humor, listeners must typically bring to mind a negative stereotype of the targeted group. Consider the following example (from Suls 1977: 82): ß. If your son flunks out of school, is illiterate and anti-social, what can he grow up to be? A. An Italian policeman. This joke makes sense only when a negative stereotype of Italian policemen is accessed, namely that Italian policemen are stupid and corrupt. Repeated exposure to disparagement humor might make negative stereotypes more accessible in memory, because frequent activation makes any Information more accessible (Higgins 1996). This effect is important because highly accessible beliefs are more likely than less accessible beliefs to guide perceptions of objects, people, and events (see Fazio 1989). For example, Higgins et al. (1977) showed that highly accessible personality dimensions influenced the Interpretation of ambiguous behaviors. Thus, if disparagement humor makes negative stereotypes more accessible, those stereotypes might guide individuals' subsequent perceptions of members of the targeted groups. 198 /. M. Olson, G. R. Maio, and K. L. Hobden The present research In the present studies, we tested whether exposure to disparagement humor would change stereotypes and/or increase stereotype accessibility. We also measured attitude extremity and accessibility in Experiments 2 and 3; attitudes are overall evaluations of targets, rather than specific Stereotypie beliefs (Olson and Zanna 1993). For ethical reasons, we targeted advantaged groups in society (men in Experiments l and 2; lawyers in Experiment 3), rather than disadvantaged or minority groups. We recognize that many, perhaps most, disparaging jokes and cartoons are directed at disadvantaged groups, but because we expected exposure to have negative effects on stereotypes and attitudes, we decided to limit our attention to groups that enjoy relatively high Status to begin with. An important direction for future research is to test the generalizability of our findings to disparaging humor about disadvantaged groups. We also examined whether effects on stereotypes would be limited to those traits specifically targeted in the humor or whether, instead, the effects would generalize to other Stereotypie traits not implicated in the humor. If the complete stereotype is an integrated construct that must be accessed to make sense of the humor, it is possible that even traits not actually addressed by the humor will become more extreme or more accessible. In all three experiments, some participants were exposed to disparaging humor, whereas others were exposed to nondisparaging humor, i.e., humor that did not disparage any group. The nondisparaging humor conditions were intended to arouse the same degree of positive affect äs the disparagement humor conditions. In Experiments 2 and 3, some subjects were exposed to disparaging Statements about the target group. These Statements were nonhumorous translations of the disparaging humor. Finally, Experiments 2 and 3 also included conditions where subjects were not exposed to any humor or Statements, but simply completed the dependent measures. These conditions constituted baselines against which the other conditions could be compared.