论文信息 - Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining

Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining

A 2-person fixed threat bargaining problem is considered. A full characterization of the solutions which satisfy all of Nash's axioms except for the axiom of symmetry is given. It is also shown that these nonsymmetric Nash solutions are precisely the solutions that arise from symmetric Nash solutions through replications.

E. Kalai

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