Cognitive Readiness in Network-Centric Operations

Abstract : Network-centric warfare is the basis of doctrine and operations for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. Fundamental to network-centric warfare is the availability of accurate, detailed, real-time information at all levels of command and control. Network-centric operations and the associated self-synchronization put a premium on the performance of individual soldiers and small teams at all levels of command and control. A critical component of such performance is the ability to integrate information, anticipate, and plan. These executive mental functions depend on the prefrontal cortex of the brain for successful execution. Various physiological stressors degrade cognitive performance. These include carrying excessive loads, dehydration, hypothermia, sleep loss (which degrades prefrontal cortex function directly), and nutritional or caloric deficiencies. Soldiers in the network-centric force will have sensors and software constituting a warfighter physiological status monitor (WPSM) incorporated into the individual soldier computer, linking them through the network-centric warfare network. These will provide information on their biomedical status with respect to these performance-degrading stressors. This information will be used by commanders to manage biomedical resupply (water, food, sleep, etc.) to sustain performance. Embedded and other measures of cognitive performance will be included in the suite of sensors and software. With these systems in place, commanders will have the tools at hand to sustain individual and unit performance in the networked force.

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