The influence of decision criteria upon remembering and knowing in recognition memory.

One may recognise an item as 'old' on basis of a recollective experience or by a feeling of familiarity without specific recollection. The former is called a 'remember' judgement; the latter a 'know' judgement. It has been claimed that remember and know responses reflect qualitatively distinct components of recognition memory, and not just derive from gradual differences in perceived trace strength or subjective certainty (i.e. remember judgments include memories of which one is more confident). Nonetheless, the present study examined the possibility that the distinction does relate to decision criteria placed upon a single familiarity axis (see Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman & Master, 1997). To this purpose, two groups of subjects were compared: one, which was instructed to be very conservative in their old-new judgements, while the other group was stimulated to be very lenient instead. Remember hit rates increased with more lenient criteria, whereas know hit rates did not, but false alarm rates did. While remember sensitivity was equal in the two groups, know sensitivity was lower with liberal criteria. Also it correlated with overall response bias. This lends support to the possibility that subjects not only apply an old-new decision criterion, but also set a remember-know criterion, which is affected in a similar way by liberal versus conservative instructions.

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