Integrating the desire–for–control and rational choice in a corporate crime context

The “rational choice” framework, with its focus on risks and rewards, is often used to explain corporate criminality. In this paper, we build on this framework by integrating the notion of “desire‐for‐control.” Although common to many psychologists, the desire‐for‐control, or the general wish to be in control over everyday life events, has not been examined for its relevance in understanding criminal activity generally, or within corporate offending in particular. After demonstrating the importance of desire‐for‐control in the corporate context, we use data from a sample of managers and MBA students to examine the extent to which desire‐for‐control relates to rational‐choice considerations and corporate criminal decision‐making. Results suggest that desire‐for‐control (1) influences the interpretation of rational‐choice considerations and (2) is positively related to corporate criminality even after controlling for a number of important situational‐ and individual‐level factors. Implications for future theoretical and empirical research are addressed.

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