论文信息 - On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.

Shao Chin Sung | Dinko Dimitrov | Dinko Dimitrov | S. Sung

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