Do data breach disclosure laws reduce identity theft?: Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?

[1]  Philip J. Cook,et al.  Public Safety Through Private Action: An Economic Assessment of Bids, Locks, and Citizen Cooperation , 2010 .

[2]  William Roberds,et al.  Data Breaches and Identity Theft , 2008, WEIS.

[3]  Joseph Simitian.  UCB Security Breach Notification Symposium March 6, 2009: How a Bill Becomes a Law, Really , 2009 .

[4]  Rahul Telang,et al.  An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on Firm Stock Price , 2007, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.

[5]  C. Hoofnagle.  Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known , 2007 .

[6]  D. Weil,et al.  Full disclosure : the perils and promise of transparency , 2007 .

[7]  P. Schwartz,et al.  Notification of Data Security Breaches , 2006 .

[8]  Bruce H. Kobayashi.  An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods , 2006, Supreme Court Economic Review.

[9]  Alessandro Acquisti,et al.  Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study , 2006, WEIS.

[10]  Bradford S. Jones,et al.  Beyond Logit and Probit: Cox Duration Models of Single, Repeating, and Competing Events for State Policy Adoption , 2005, State Politics & Policy Quarterly.

[11]  Huseyin Cavusoglu,et al.  The Effect of Internet Security Breach Announcements on Market Value: Capital Market Reactions for Breached Firms and Internet Security Developers , 2004, Int. J. Electron. Commer..

[12]  Hashem Dezhbakhsh,et al.  The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a "Judicial Experiment" , 2006 .

[13]  R. Gittings,et al.  Getting off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment* , 2003, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[14]  Lei Zhou,et al.  The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced Information Security Breaches: Empirical Evidence from the Stock Market , 2003, J. Comput. Secur..

[15]  Laura Dugan,et al.  Identifying Unit-Dependency and Time-Specificity in Longitudinal Analysis: A Graphical Methodology , 2002 .

[16]  G. Jin,et al.  The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards , 2002 .

[17]  E. Duflo,et al.  How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? , 2001 .

[18]  Alan D. Mathios,et al.  The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market* , 2000, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[19]  Dan A. Black,et al.  Do Right‐To‐Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime? , 1998, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[20]  Steven D. Levitt,et al.  Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack , 1997 .

[21]  David B. Mustard,et al.  Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed Handguns , 1997, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[22]  Steven Shavell,et al.  Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimalbehavior , 1990 .

[23]  Charles D. Kolstad,et al.  Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? , 1990 .

[24]  Philip J. Cook,et al.  The Demand and Supply of Criminal Opportunities , 1986, Crime and Justice.

[25]  Steven Shavell,et al.  A MODEL OF THE OPTIMAL USE OF LIABILITY AND SAFETY REGULATION , 1984 .

[26]  Albert D. Biderman,et al.  On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime , 1967 .