Implicit conflict detection during decision making

Implicit Conflict Detection During Decision Making Wim De Neys (Wim.Deneys@psy.kuleuven.be) Department of Psychology, K.U.Leuven, Tiensestraat 102 3000 Leuven, Belgium need to override the belief-based response generated by the heuristic system (Stanovich & West, 2000). Although the dual process framework has been very influential (and with the work of D. Kahneman & A. Tversky even indirectly awarded a Nobel prize) it has also been criticized (e.g., Evans, in press; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Osman, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). The characterization of the conflict detection process is a crucial case in point. Dual process theories generally state that the analytic system is monitoring the output of the heuristic system. When a conflict with analytic knowledge (e.g., sample size considerations) is detected, the analytic system will attempt to intervene and inhibit the prepotent heuristic response. However, if one looks at the literature it becomes clear that there are some widely different views on the efficiency of the conflict monitoring component during judgement and decision making. The classic work of Kahneman and colleagues, for example, claims that the monitoring of the heuristic system is quite lax (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). It is assumed that by default people will tend to rely on the heuristic route without taking analytic considerations into account. In some cases people can detect the conflict and the analytic system will intervene but typically this will be quite rare. Most of the time people will simply not be aware that their response might be incorrect from a normative point of view. As Kahneman and Frederick (p. 274) put it: “People who make a casual intuitive judgement normally know little about how their judgment come about and know even less about its logical entailments”. Thus, in this view people mainly err because they fail to detect a conflict. In the work of Epstein (1994) and Sloman (1996) one finds a remarkably different view on conflict monitoring and the nature of reasoning errors. These authors assume that in general the heuristic and analytic routes are simultaneously activated and people typically do experience a conflict between two types of reasoning. People would “simultaneously believe two contradictory responses” (Sloman, 1996, p. 11) and therefore “behave against their better judgement” (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, p. 1) when they err. Thus, people would be taking analytic considerations in mind and notice that they conflict with the heuristically cued belief. The problem, however, is that they do not always manage to override the compelling heuristics. In this view there is nothing wrong with the conflict detection process. Errors arise because people fail to inhibit the prepotent heuristic beliefs. Based on the available data it is hard to decide between the different models and determine which conflict detection view is correct (e.g., Evans, in press). The most compelling evidence for successful conflict detection during decision Abstract Popular dual process theories of reasoning and decision making have characterized human thinking as an interplay of an intuitive and analytic reasoning process. Although monitoring the output of the two systems for conflict is crucial to avoid decision making errors there are some widely different views on the efficiency of the process. Kahneman (2002) claims that the monitoring of the intuitive system is typically quite lax whereas others such as Sloman (1996) and Epstein (1994) claim it is flawless and people typically experience a struggle between what they “know” and “feel” in case of a conflict. The present study contrasted these views. Participants solved classic base rate neglect problems while thinking aloud. Verbal protocols showed no evidence for an explicitly experienced conflict. As Kahneman predicted, participants hardly ever mentioned the base rates and seemed to base their judgment exclusively on heuristic reasoning. However, a more implicit measure of conflict detection based on participants’ retrieval of the base rate information in an unannounced recall test showed that the base rates had been thoroughly processed. Results indicate that although the popular characterization of conflict detection as an actively experienced struggle needs to be revised there is nevertheless evidence for Sloman and Epstein’s basic claim about the flawless operation of the conflict monitoring process. Introduction Human reasoners seem to have a strong preference to base judgments on prior beliefs and intuition rather than on a logical reasoning process. Over the last decades numerous studies have shown that this tendency is biasing performance in many classic reasoning and decision making tasks (Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Influential dual process theories of thinking have explained people’s “rational thinking failure” by positing two different human reasoning systems (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2003; Goel, 1995; Kahneman, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). Dual process theories come in many flavors but generally they assume that a first system (often called the heuristic system) will tend to solve a problem by relying on prior knowledge and beliefs whereas a second system (often called the analytic system) allows reasoning according to logical standards. The heuristic default system is assumed to operate fast and automatically whereas the operations of the analytic system would be slow and heavily demanding of people’s computational resources. Dual process theories state that the heuristic and analytic system will often interact in concert. Hence, on these occasions the heuristic default system will provide us with fast, frugal, and correct conclusions. However, the prepotent heuristics can also bias reasoning in situations that require more elaborate, analytic processing. That is, both systems will sometimes conflict and cue different responses. In these cases the analytic system will