The Mitigation Alliance target and its distribution

Misalignment between the Paris Agreement (PA) objectives and its implementation tools represents the biggest challenge for its implementation. The compromise between top-down urgencies, such as the 2/1.5 °C target, and bottom-up stances, such as the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) pledge-and-review system removed years of efforts for identifying effective and equitable systems to combat climate change, threatening the same signification of the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) principle. The Mitigation Alliance (MA) proposed in this book offers a feasible alternative to the current system. It applies to entities that voluntarily collaborate under the framework of the PA’s Article 6 (A6PA) and entails the establishment of an aggregate Net Zero Carbon (NZC) target for the MA and a technical, flexible distribution of the corresponding mitigation burden. While the NZC is based on scientific evidence, the hereby-proposed distribution system represents a key innovation. By introducing a dynamic formula for distributing the mitigation burden (or quota) among its members, the MA aligns ambition with the PA’s objectives while taking full account of the CBDR-RC principle.

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