论文信息 - Deflationism and Tarski's paradise

Deflationism and Tarski's paradise

I present some technical results, some of which may be found in Tarski (1936), concerning the logical properties of truth theories; in particular, concerning the conservativeness of adding a truth theory for an object level language to any theory expressed in it. It transpires that various deflationary truth theories behave somewhat differently from the standard Tarskian truth theory. These results suggest that Tarskian theories of truth are not redundant or dispensable.

J Ketland | J. Ketland

[1] S. Haack. Philosophy of logics , 1978 .

[2] Stephen Leeds,et al. Theories of references and truth , 1978 .

[3] F. Ramsey,et al. Facts and Propositions , 1927 .

[4] Michael Barr,et al. The Emperor's New Mind , 1989 .

[5] J. Lucas. Minds, Machines and Gödel , 1961, Philosophy.

[6] Hilary Putnam,et al. Reason, Truth and History. , 1985 .

[7] S. Shapiro,et al. Mathematics without Numbers , 1993 .

[8] S. Shapiro. Conservativeness and Incompleteness , 1983 .

[9] W. Quine. On What There Is , 1948 .

[10] Saul A. Kripke,et al. Outline of a Theory of Truth , 1975 .

[11] Richard L. Kirkham. Theories of truth : a critical introduction , 1995 .

[12] Evert W. Beth,et al. On Padoa’s Method in the Theory of Definition , 1953 .

[13] Hartry Field,et al. Science without Numbers , 1983 .

[14] John P. Burgess,et al. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics , 2001 .

[15] A. J. Ayer,et al. Language, Truth, and Logic , 1936 .