Coordination of multi-agents with a revenue-cost-sharing mechanism : A cooperative game theory approach

In this paper we focus on the coordination of multi-agents through a revenue-cost-sharing mechanism. We consider a grand-coalition consisting of finite agents, who undertake part of the costs individually, while the remaining costs C and the total revenues R are shared between them with a revenue-cost-sharing contract. We introduce a novel approach in the form of a cooperative game for a finite set of agents N and we estimate the finite set of possible solutions. Specifically, each of these solutions can be used for the coordination of the multi-agents, as it allocates the grand-coalition's profits and risks equally among them. A computation algorithm is developed and illustrated in a numerical example for the coordination of a grand-coalition with nine individual agents.

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