In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm

Many centralized entry-level labor markets use the firm-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm to compute the matching that is implemented among workers and firms. We propose a definition of the strategic options a worker faces in the DA-algorithm. Then we develop a theory to advise workers who distinguish between the firms from which they believe not to receive a proposal, the firms from which they might receive a proposal, and the firms from which they certainly receive a proposal. If a worker is not able to deduce which new proposals she receives after having rejected others, then it is not profitable for her to submit a list that reverses the true ranking of any two acceptable firms. Furthermore, it is not beneficial for her to include a firm in her submitted list that is unacceptable to her.

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