Ridesharing User Equilibrium and Its Implications for High-Occupancy Toll Lane Pricing

Shared mobility—ridesharing in particular—has become an important research topic in recent years because of the ability to relieve traffic congestion, reduce travel costs, and reduce energy consumption. However, researchers in transportation science still lack an understanding of how to incorporate ridesharing into the transportation planning process, specifically in the traffic assignment problem. This paper presents ridesharing user equilibrium (RUE) as a path-flow–based nonlinear complementarity problem with side constraints. This formulation is extended by considering the presence of high-occupancy toll lanes. A numerical example is given to illustrate the relationships of the path cost coefficients on RUE and on the occurrence of the Braess paradox. The performance of two tolling strategies is compared: one charges single-occupancy vehicles, and the other charges both single-occupancy vehicles and vehicles carrying only one passenger.

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