The veil of public ignorance

Abstract A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian “standard of evaluation” governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information. Our first main result generalizes Harsanyi's (J. Polit. Econ. 63 (1955) 309) classical result to situations of incomplete information, assuming that group preferences satisfy Bayesian Coherence and Interim Pareto Dominance. These axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists. We argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of Bayesian preference aggregation under complete information.

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