The t-wise Independence of Substitution-Permutation Networks

Block ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (Rijndael) are used extensively in practice, yet our understanding of their security continues to be highly incomplete. This paper promotes and continues a research program aimed at proving the security of block ciphers against important and well-studied classes of attacks. In particular, we initiate the study of (almost) t-wise independence of concrete block-cipher construction paradigms such as substitutionpermutation networks and key-alternating ciphers. Sufficiently strong (almost) pairwise independence already suffices to resist (truncated) differential attacks and linear cryptanalysis, and hence this is a relevant and meaningful target. Our results are two-fold. Our first result concerns substitution-permutation networks (SPNs) that model ciphers such as AES. We prove the almost pairwise-independence of an SPN instantiated with concrete Sboxes together with an appropriate linear mixing layer, given sufficiently many rounds and independent sub-keys. Our proof relies on a characterization of S-box computation on input differences in terms of sampling output differences from certain subspaces, and a new randomness extraction lemma (which we prove with Fourier-analytic techniques) that establishes when such sampling yields uniformity. We use our techniques in particular to prove almost pairwiseindependence for sufficiently many rounds of both the AES block cipher (which uses a variant of the patched inverse function x 7→ x as the S-box) and the MiMC block cipher (which uses the cubing function x 7→ x as the S-box), assuming independent sub-keys. Secondly, we show that instantiating a key-alternating cipher (which can be thought of as a degenerate case of SPNs) with most permutations gives us (almost) t-wise independence in t+o(t) rounds. In order to do this, we use the probabilistic method to develop two new lemmas, an independence-amplification lemma and a distance amplification lemma, that allow us to reason about the evolution of key-alternating ciphers.