Vickrey allocation rule with income effect

We consider situations in which a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. In this paper, we establish that on domains that include nonquasi-linear preferences—preferences exhibiting income effects—an allocation rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment uniquely exists, which is the Vickrey allocation rule.

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