Probability and proximity in surprise

This paper proposes an analysis of surprise formulated in terms of proximity to the truth, to replace the probabilistic account of surprise. It is common to link surprise to the low (prior) probability of the outcome. The idea seems sensible because an outcome with a low probability is unexpected, and an unexpected outcome often surprises us. However, the link between surprise and low probability is known to break down in some cases. There have been some attempts to modify the probabilistic account to deal with these cases, but as we shall see, they are still faced with problems. The new analysis of surprise I propose turns to accuracy (proximity to the truth) and identifies an unexpected degree of inaccuracy as reason for surprise. The shift from probability to proximity allows us to solve puzzles that strain the probabilistic account of surprise.

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