Optimal Information Asymmetry

At the heart of decentralization lies the notion that tasks are delegated by owners to managers who possess superior local information. The extent of this information asymmetry is often an endogenous construct, as it is influenced by the owner's choice of internal accounting systems and the manager's investment in acquiring local expertise. In this paper, we explore how varying levels of pre‐contract, asymmetric information affect the owner‐manager relationship. We provide three main sets of insights. First, we find that the owner's payoffs are initially decreasing, and strictly convex everywhere, in the quality of the manager's private information. The owner thus prefers to deal with either a perfectly informed or a perfectly uninformed manager, and we characterize conditions for either to be the preferred choice. Second, in contrast to recent work, we demonstrate that when information can be communicated internally, the optimal strength of managerial incentives unambiguously decreases as the manager bec...

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