Emission allocation issues in repositioning transportation

ABSTRACT Various emission reduction methods have been investigated in relation to policy, technology, and operation in academia and industry. Increasing capacity utilization by sharing transportation network and gaining return cargo is one potential approach to achieve this reduction. As a consequence, repositioning of the vehicle is needed in some cases, which needs to be supported by a proper emission allocation scheme to encourage different players to form and maintain a sharing coalition. However, the presence of repositioning adds a level of complexity to the emission allocation issue since empty trips in repositioning transportation carry no cargo themselves to which the emissions can be allocated. For this purpose, we present alternative allocation schemes and investigate the impacts of these schemes on the carbon footprint measurement. A real-life case study is demonstrated and discussed based on a simulation model and analysis of variance (ANOVA). We find that different schemes have significant effects on the distribution of emission among the cargo owners. We suggest that a scheme to share the emissions based on total transport work is preferable because it provides motivation for a joint cooperation between players and improves the environmental performance. The methodology applied in this article can be generalized to other repositioning transport cases in which more players and more logistics legs including empty trips are involved. It also provides insight for policymakers to devise rules for carbon footprint calculations that encourage collaboration and shared transport in complex, multi-stakeholder transportation networks.

[1]  Jeroen Kuipers,et al.  Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach , 2013, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[2]  世界環境経済人協議会 Greenhouse gas protocol : a corporate accounting and reporting standard , 2001 .

[3]  Mikael Rönnqvist,et al.  Cost Allocation in Collaborative Forest Transportation , 2006, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[4]  Myong-Hun Chang,et al.  Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy, by Roger A. McCain , 2013 .

[5]  N. H. Ravindranath,et al.  2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories , 2006 .

[6]  Zhibin Jiang,et al.  Empty container repositioning - a review , 2010, 2010 8th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation.

[7]  Alan C. McKinnon,et al.  Product‐level carbon auditing of supply chains: Environmental imperative or wasteful distraction? , 2010 .

[8]  Christof Kandel,et al.  SHAPLEY VALUE SIMULATION FOR ALLOCATING GHG EMISSION SAVINGS DUE TO LOGISTICS POOLING WITHIN ECR COOPERATIONS , 2011 .

[9]  Miguel A. Figliozzi,et al.  Vehicle Routing Problem for Emissions Minimization , 2010 .

[10]  Gilbert Laporte,et al.  Horizontal cooperation among freight carriers: request allocation and profit sharing , 2008, J. Oper. Res. Soc..

[11]  Moshe Givoni,et al.  Environmental Benefits from Mode Substitution: Comparison of the Environmental Impact from Aircraft and High-Speed Train Operations , 2007 .

[12]  Roger A McCain Game theory : non-technical introduction to the analysis ofstrategy , 2003 .

[13]  D. Cattrysse,et al.  Cost allocation in spare parts inventory pooling , 2007 .

[14]  Özlem Ergun,et al.  Network Design and Allocation Mechanisms for Carrier Alliances in Liner Shipping , 2010, Oper. Res..

[15]  V. Roshan Joseph,et al.  Estimating and Benchmarking Less-Than-Truckload Market Rates , 2010 .

[16]  Stein Ove Erikstad,et al.  Emission allocation problems in the maritime logistics chain , 2014, EURO J. Transp. Logist..

[17]  Jay Wintergreen,et al.  ISO 14064, International Standard for GHG Emissions Inventories and Verification , 2006 .

[18]  Avinash Unnikrishnan,et al.  Models for Minimizing Backhaul Costs through Freight Collaboration , 2011 .

[19]  Jingjing Xu,et al.  CO2 Emission Comparison Between Direct and Feeder Liner Services: A Case Study of Asia–Europe Services Interfacing with the UK , 2012 .

[20]  Lawrence W. Lan,et al.  Development and Deployment of Sustainable Transportation , 2007 .

[21]  Miguel A. Figliozzi,et al.  Analysis and Evaluation of Incentive Compatible Dynamic Mechanisms for Carrier Collaboration , 2006 .

[22]  Lori Marie Houghtalen,et al.  Designing Allocation Mechanisms for Carrier Alliances , 2007 .