Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints

Summary. This paper presents optimal collective dichotomous choices under quota constraints. We focus on committees that have to decide whether to accept or reject a set of projects under quota constraints. We provide a method for optimal ranking of projects which is suitable for solving this problem. The main result generalizes a number of earlier results in the subject. To outline the applicability of our method, we demonstrate its usage in the area of information filtering.

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