Worm-IT - A wormhole-based intrusion-tolerant group communication system

This paper presents Worm-IT, a new intrusion-tolerant group communication system with a membership service and a view-synchronous atomic multicast primitive. The system is intrusion-tolerant in the sense that it behaves correctly even if some nodes are corrupted and become malicious. It is based on a novel approach that enhances the environment with a special secure distributed component used by the protocols to execute securely a few crucial operations. Using this approach, we manage to bring together two important features: Worm-IT tolerates the maximum number of malicious members possible; it does not have to detect the failure of primary-members, a problem in previous intrusion-tolerant group communication systems.

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