Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard
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S. Matthew Weinberg | Linda Cai | Clayton Thomas | S. Weinberg | L. Cai | Clayton Thomas | Cai | Matthew Weinberg
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