Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws?

The failure of individuals to pay their taxes in full is a serious budgetary problem for the federal government. Existing research (Schwartz and Orleans, 1967; Grasmick and Scott, 1982) suggests that efforts to increase the guilt feelings experienced for tax evasion might improve compliance. However, neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza, 1957) predicts that guilt feelings can be reduced by neutralization strategies which justify guilt-producing behavior, compromising the inhibiting effect of guilt feelings. Our research shows that through the use of neutralization strategies which justify tax evasion the inhibiting effect of guilt feelings is sharply reduced. The implications of this finding for tax compliance programs based on appeals to the moral obligation of paying taxes are discussed.

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