Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment

In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, and can be seen as the Jeffrization of a proposal considered by Rott.

[1]  F. Ramsey.  General Propositions and Causality , 1931 .

[2]  Robert Stalnaker.  A Theory of Conditionals , 2019, Knowledge and Conditionals.

[3]  C. E. Alchourrón,et al.  On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions , 1985 .

[4]  David Makinson,et al.  On the logic of theory change: Safe contraction , 1985, Stud Logica.

[5]  David Makinson,et al.  Maps between some different kinds of contraction function: The finite case , 1986, Stud Logica.

[6]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States , 1988 .

[7]  P. Gärdenfors,et al.  Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrenchment , 1988, TARK.

[8]  Adam J. Grove,et al.  Two modellings for theory change , 1988, J. Philos. Log..

[9]  Peter Gärdenfors,et al.  Knowledge in Flux , 1988 .

[10]  Reinhard Niederée.  Multiple contraction. A further case against Gärdenfors' principle of recovery , 1989, The Logic of Theory Change.

[11]  Hans Rott,et al.  A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. Part 1: Semantics and logic of simple conditionals , 1989, The Logic of Theory Change.

[12]  Hans Rott,et al.  Two methods of constructing contractions and revisions of knowledge systems , 1991, J. Philos. Log..

[13]  Karl Schlechta,et al.  Theory Revision and Probability , 1991, Notre Dame J. Formal Log..

[14]  H. Rott.  On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function , 1992 .

[15]  Hans Rott,et al.  Modellings for Belief Change: Base Contraction, Multiple Contraction, and Epistemic Entrenchment , 1992, JELIA.

[16]  Sven Ove Hansson.  Belief Revision: A dyadic representation of belief , 1992 .

[17]  Hans Rott,et al.  Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment , 1992, J. Log. Lang. Inf..

[18]  SVEN OVE HANSSON,et al.  Reversing the Levi identity , 1993, J. Philos. Log..

[19]  Sven Ove Hansson,et al.  Changes of disjunctively closed bases , 1993, J. Log. Lang. Inf..

[20]  Abhaya C. Nayak.  Studies in belief change , 1993 .

[21]  Mary-Anne Williams,et al.  Transmutations of Knowledge Systems , 1994, KR.

[22]  S. Hansson.  Changes in preference , 1995 .

[23]  Peter Gärdenfors,et al.  Belief Revision , 1995 .