Recent developments in the theory of regulation

[1]  David E. M. Sappington,et al.  Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries , 2007 .

[2]  Leon Yang Chu,et al.  Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts , 2007 .

[3]  Patrick Rey,et al.  A Primer on Foreclosure , 2007 .

[4]  Philippe Jehiel,et al.  License Auctions and Market Structure , 2006 .

[5]  P. Klemperer,et al.  Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects , 2006 .

[6]  A. Ghosh,et al.  Free Entry and Social Efficiency Under Vertical Oligopoly , 2005 .

[7]  D. Sappington.  On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions , 2005 .

[8]  G. Guthrie.  Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment , 2005 .

[9]  Mark Armstrong,et al.  Regulation, Competition and Liberalization , 2005 .

[10]  John Asker,et al.  Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter , 2005 .

[11]  Francesc Trillas,et al.  Utility price regulation and time inconsistency: comparisons with monetary policy , 2005 .

[12]  D. Sappington.  Regulating Service Quality: A Survey , 2005 .

[13]  Daniel Flores,et al.  Price cap regulation in the Mexican telephone industry , 2005, Information Economics and Policy.

[14]  Elisabetta Iossa,et al.  Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition , 2005, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[15]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Price regulation and quality , 2005, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[16]  K. Currier,et al.  Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation , 2005 .

[17]  Jean-Jacques Laffont,et al.  Regulation and Development: References , 2005 .

[18]  M. A. Crew,et al.  Bringing Competition to Telecommunications by Divesting the RBOCs , 2005 .

[19]  J. Sand.  Regulation with non-price discrimination , 2004 .

[20]  Mark Armstrong.  Network interconnection with asymmetric networks and heterogeneous calling patterns , 2004, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[21]  A. Iozzi,et al.  Bigger and Better: A Dynamic Regulatory Mechanism for Optimum Quality , 2004 .

[22]  M. Armstrong,et al.  Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information , 2004 .

[23]  I. Dobbs,et al.  Intertemporal Price Cap Regulation Under Uncertainty , 2004 .

[24]  James J. Anton,et al.  Regulation, Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition , 2004 .

[25]  Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al.  Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?" RAND Journal of Economics , 2004 .

[26]  Patrick DeGraba.  Reconciling the off-net cost pricing principle with efficient network utilization , 2004, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[27]  Ulrich Berger.  Bill-and-Keep vs. Cost-Based Access Pricing Revisited , 2004 .

[28]  Optimal risk allocation for regulated monopolies and consumers , 2004 .

[29]  S. Severinov.  Optimal Organization : Centralization , Decentralization or Delegation ? , 2004 .

[30]  D. Geradin,et al.  European and American Approaches to Antitrust Remedies and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Telecommunications , 2003 .

[31]  David M. Mandy,et al.  Dynamic Pricing and Investment from Static Proxy Models , 2003 .

[32]  Wouter Dessein.  Network competition in nonlinear pricing , 2003 .

[33]  Collusion Under Yardstick Competition. An Experimental Study , 2003 .

[34]  Ingo Vogelsang,et al.  Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks , 2003 .

[35]  A. Coulter.  Killing the goose that laid the golden egg? , 2003, British medical journal.

[36]  Álvaro E. Bustos,et al.  Vertical Integration and Sabotage in Regulated Industries , 2003 .

[37]  Y. Spiegel,et al.  Optimal State-Contingent Regulation Under Limited Liability , 2003 .

[38]  William P. Rogerson,et al.  Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation , 2003 .

[39]  Paul L. Joskow,et al.  The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the U.S , 2003 .

[40]  Mark Armstrong,et al.  The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note , 2003 .

[41]  J. Vickers,et al.  Multiproduct Price Regulation under Asymmetric Information. , 2003 .

[42]  Simon Cowan.  Tight Average Revenue Regulation Can Be Worse Than No Regulation , 2003 .

[43]  John W. Mayo,et al.  Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage , 2003 .

[44]  Michael R. Ward,et al.  Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry , 2003 .

[45]  Catherine C. Eckel,et al.  Introduction: What Role Can Experiments Play in Research on Regulation? , 2003 .

[46]  D. Sappington.  Regulating horizontal diversification , 2003 .

[47]  Frank Verboven,et al.  Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment , 2003 .

[48]  J. Rochet,et al.  The Economics of Multidimensional Screening , 2003 .

[49]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Did the High Court Reach an Economic Low in Verizon V. Fcc , 2002 .

[50]  David M. Mandy.  TELRIC Pricing with Vintage Capital , 2002 .

[51]  Elisabetta Iossa,et al.  Price cap regulation and information acquisition , 2002 .

[52]  Patrick DeGraba.  Efficient Inter-Carrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Customers Share the Value of a Call , 2002 .

[53]  I. Vogelsang.  Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective , 2002 .

[54]  James J. Anton,et al.  Entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross-market price constraints , 2002 .

[55]  R. Crandall,et al.  Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition , 2002 .

[56]  T. Lewis,et al.  Learning by Doing and Dynamic Regulation , 2002 .

[57]  Roman Inderst,et al.  Contract design and bargaining power , 2002 .

[58]  Paul R. Kleindorfer,et al.  Regulatory Economics: Twenty Years of Progress? , 2002 .

[59]  J. Laffont,et al.  The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model , 2001 .

[60]  W. Baumol,et al.  The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors , 2001 .

[61]  Roland Strausz,et al.  Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case , 2001 .

[62]  Mark Armstrong,et al.  Access Pricing, Bypass, and Universal Service , 2001 .

[63]  M. Armstrong.  The theory of access pricing and interconnection , 2001 .

[64]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The Costs and Benefits of Long-Distance Entry: Regulation and Non-Price Discrimination , 2001 .

[65]  Marc Bourreau,et al.  Regulation and innovation in the telecommunications industry , 2001 .

[66]  Jean Tirole,et al.  On the Receiver Pays Principle , 2001 .

[67]  Steven A. Matthews.  Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts under Limited Liability and Monotonicity , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.

[68]  Julian Wright,et al.  Asymmetric Network Interconnection , 2001 .

[69]  B. Biais,et al.  Machiavellian Privatization , 2001 .

[70]  I. Vogelsang,et al.  UNIVERSAL RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE SERVICE , 2001 .

[71]  Ian L. Gale,et al.  Optimal Design of Research Contests , 2003 .

[72]  Marco Celentani,et al.  Corruption and Competition in Procurement , 2001 .

[73]  Steinar Vagstad,et al.  Procurement auctions with entry of bidders , 2000 .

[74]  M. Riordan,et al.  Dynamics of Price Regulation , 2000 .

[75]  Tracy R. Lewis,et al.  Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors , 2000 .

[76]  Jong-Hee Hahn,et al.  Network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers , 2000 .

[77]  M. Armstrong.  Optimal Multi-Object Auctions , 2000 .

[78]  C. Avery,et al.  Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products , 2000 .

[79]  Bruno Jullien,et al.  Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[80]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation , 2000 .

[81]  Yeon-Koo Che,et al.  The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[82]  D. Newbery.  Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities , 2000 .

[83]  David J. Salant,et al.  Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms** , 2000 .

[84]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  Do consumers benefit from tighter price cap regulation , 2000 .

[85]  H. Trebing.  Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract , 2000 .

[86]  David M. Mandy.  Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays , 2000 .

[87]  Klaus M. Schmidt.  The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation , 2000 .

[88]  J. Laffont,et al.  Competition in telecommunications , 1999 .

[89]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of Its Implementation by the Feder , 1999 .

[90]  J. M. Rocha,et al.  A Note on the Optimal Structure of Production , 1999 .

[91]  Jerry A. Hausman,et al.  A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks , 1999 .

[92]  Joshua S. Gans,et al.  Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competition , 1999 .

[93]  Thomas P. Tangerås.  Collusion-proof yardstick competition , 1999 .

[94]  D. Martimort.  Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators , 1999 .

[95]  E. Iossa.  Informative Externalities and Pricing in Regulated Multiproduct Industries , 1999 .

[96]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctionin Entry into Tournaments , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[97]  David Martimort,et al.  Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior , 1999 .

[98]  Jonathan H. Hamilton,et al.  Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist , 1999 .

[99]  Jean-Charles Rochet,et al.  Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide , 1999 .

[100]  D. Sappington,et al.  Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition , 1999 .

[101]  William B. Tye,et al.  Promoting effective competition through interconnection policy , 1999 .

[102]  J. Laffont,et al.  Empirical Evaluation of Regulatory Regimes in Local Telecommunications Markets , 1999 .

[103]  M. Armstrong.  Optimal Regulation with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions , 1999 .

[104]  M. Carter,et al.  Interconnection in Network Industries , 1999 .

[105]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets , 1998 .

[106]  Jean-Charles Rochet,et al.  Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm , 1998 .

[107]  C. Scarpa.  Minimum quality standards with more than two firms , 1998 .

[108]  Dennis L. Weisman.  The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically-Integrated Regulated Firm: A Reply , 1998 .

[109]  Jean-Charles Rochet,et al.  Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered , 1998 .

[110]  D. Reiffen.  A Regulated Firm's Incentive to Discriminate: A Reevaluation and Extension of Weisman's Result , 1998 .

[111]  Nicolas Curien,et al.  Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition , 1998 .

[112]  D. Sappington,et al.  Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans , 1998 .

[113]  Paul Milgrom,et al.  Game theory and the spectrum auctions , 1998 .

[114]  M. Armstrong.  Network Interconnection in Telecommunications , 1998 .

[115]  J. D. Zona,et al.  An Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Long-Distance Market Entry by an Integrated Access and Long-Distance Provider , 1998 .

[116]  J. Laffont,et al.  Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination , 1998 .

[117]  J. Laffont,et al.  Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing , 1998 .

[118]  Ian L. Gale,et al.  Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders , 1998 .

[119]  E. Auriol.  Deregulation and Quality , 1998 .

[120]  Nicholas Economides,et al.  The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input Monopolist , 1998 .

[121]  Asher Wolinsky,et al.  Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies , 1997 .

[122]  Sang‐Ho Lee.  A Note on Regulating a Multiproduct Monopolist , 1997 .

[123]  Joel Sobel,et al.  A Re-Examination of Yardstick Competition , 1997 .

[124]  P. Cramton.  The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment , 1997 .

[125]  Tracy R. Lewis,et al.  Information Management in Incentive Problems , 1997, Journal of Political Economy.

[126]  P. Joskow.  Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector , 1997 .

[127]  Simon Cowan.  Price-Cap Regulation and Inefficiency in Relative Pricing , 1997 .

[128]  David Martimort,et al.  Collusion under Asymmetric Information , 1997 .

[129]  S. Lee.  A Note on Regulating Oligopolistic Industries: A Hierarchical Model , 1997 .

[130]  John Vickers,et al.  Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives , 1997, Journal of Political Economy.

[131]  F. Branco.  The Design of Multidimensional Auctions , 1997 .

[132]  Daniel F. Spulber,et al.  Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives , 1997 .

[133]  Y. Otsuka.  A Welfare Analysis of Local Franchise and Other Types of Regulation: Evidence from the Cable TV Industry , 1997 .

[134]  John T. Warren,et al.  Allocative efficiency and diversification under price-cap regulation , 1997 .

[135]  Inefficiency of the Subgame Optimal Entry Regulation , 1997 .

[136]  Fahad Khalil.  Auditing Without Commitment , 1997 .

[137]  P. Law.  Welfare effects of pricing in anticipation of Laspeyres price‐cap regulation: an example , 1997 .

[138]  Jean-Charles Rochet,et al.  Contracts and Productive Information Gathering , 1997 .

[139]  J. Jansen.  Regulating Complementary Input Supply: Cost Correlation and Limited Liability , 1997 .

[140]  Jerry A. Hausman,et al.  Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications , 1997 .

[141]  D. E. Sappington,et al.  Designing Incentive Regulation for the Telecommunications Industry , 1999 .

[142]  Arijit Sen.  Termination Clauses in Long‐Term Contracts , 1996 .

[143]  J. Laffont,et al.  Creating competition through interconnection: Theory and practice , 1996 .

[144]  B. Salani'e,et al.  Long-Term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information , 1996 .

[145]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  Revenue sharing in incentive regulation plans , 1996 .

[146]  O. Hart,et al.  The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons , 1996 .

[147]  J. Vickers,et al.  The access pricing problem: a synthesis , 1996 .

[148]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The effects of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry: A survey , 1996 .

[149]  Thomas P. Lyon.  A model of sliding-scale regulation , 1996 .

[150]  C. Ma,et al.  Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm , 1996 .

[151]  Michael H. Riordan,et al.  Contracting with Qualified Suppliers , 1996 .

[152]  R. McAfee,et al.  Analyzing the Airwaves Auction , 1996 .

[153]  W. Baumol,et al.  Parity pricing and its critics : necessary condition for efficiency in provision of bottleneck services to competitors , 1996 .

[154]  Dag Morten Dalen,et al.  Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives , 1998 .

[155]  D. M. Dalen.  Regulation of Quality and the Ratchet Effect: Does Unverifiability Hurt the Regulator? , 1997 .

[156]  P. Law.  Tighter Average Revenue Regulation Can Reduce Consumer Welfare , 1995 .

[157]  R. Foreman.  Pricing incentives under price-cap regulation , 1995 .

[158]  Jae-Cheol Kim,et al.  Regulating a multi-product monopolist , 1995 .

[159]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Regulation and the vertically integrated firm: The case of RBOC entry into interlata long distance , 1995 .

[160]  J. Vickers.  Concepts of Competition , 1995 .

[161]  Robert L. Mansell,et al.  Traditional and Incentive Regulation: Applications to Natural Gas Pipelines in Canada , 1995 .

[162]  Simon Cowan,et al.  Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation , 1995 .

[163]  Curtis R. Taylor.  Digging for golden carrots: an analysis of research tournaments , 1995 .

[164]  R. Fraser.  The relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly: The role of price-cap regulation , 1995 .

[165]  Giovanni Maggi,et al.  On Countervailing Incentives , 1995 .

[166]  N. Economides,et al.  Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule”? , 1995 .

[167]  Daniel R. Vincent,et al.  Optimal Procurement Mechanisms , 1995 .

[168]  N. Economides,et al.  Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the "Efficient Component Pricing Rule"? , 1995 .

[169]  W. Encinosa,et al.  Toward a benchmark for optimal prudency policy , 1995 .

[170]  David J. Salant,et al.  Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation , 1995 .

[171]  Yeon-Koo Che.  Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion , 1995 .

[172]  Richard J. Gilbert,et al.  Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis , 1995 .

[173]  Gary Biglaiser,et al.  Regulating a Dominant Firm: Unknown Demand and Industry Structure , 1995 .

[174]  John Vickers,et al.  Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets , 1995 .

[175]  Ian L. Gale,et al.  The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers , 1995 .

[176]  Ben Lockwood,et al.  Multi-firm regulation without lump-sum taxes , 1995 .

[177]  M. Riordan,et al.  Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers , 1995 .

[178]  J. Laffont,et al.  Access pricing and competition , 1994 .

[179]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Why less may be more under price-cap regulation , 1994 .

[180]  P. T. Spiller,et al.  The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation , 1994 .

[181]  Patrick Rey,et al.  Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets , 1994 .

[182]  Y. Spiegel.  The capital structure and investment of regulated firms under alternative regulatory regimes , 1994 .

[183]  B. Blackmon,et al.  Incentive Regulation and the Regulation of Incentives , 1994 .

[184]  J. Mcmillan.  Selling Spectrum Rights , 1994 .

[185]  Lars Stole.  Information expropriation and moral hazard in optimal second-source auctions , 1994 .

[186]  D. Sappington.  Designing incentive regulation , 1994 .

[187]  Timothy J. Brennan,et al.  Comparing the costs and benefits of diversification by regulated firms , 1994 .

[188]  F. Gasmi,et al.  Rent extraction and incentives for efficiency in recent regulatory proposals , 1994 .

[189]  Martin W. Cripps,et al.  The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case , 1994 .

[190]  John G. Lynch,et al.  Regulatory measurement and evaluation of telephone service quality , 1994 .

[191]  Jonathan Glover.  A Simpler Mechanism That Stops Agents from Cheating , 1994 .

[192]  Sylvia Schwermer.  Regulating oligopolistic industries: A generalized incentive scheme , 1994 .

[193]  D. Newbery,et al.  The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions , 1994 .

[194]  C. Ma.  Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts , 1994 .

[195]  Daniel F. Spulber,et al.  The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm , 1994 .

[196]  Simon Cowan,et al.  Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience , 1994 .

[197]  J. Dana,et al.  Designing a private industry: Government auctions with endogenous market structure , 1994 .

[198]  Mark Armstrong,et al.  Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation , 1993 .

[199]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Superior regulatory regimes in theory and practice , 1993 .

[200]  George S. Ford,et al.  Toward Competition in Local Telephony , 1993 .

[201]  A. Bower.  Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency , 1993 .

[202]  D. Sibley,et al.  Regulatory incentive policies and abuse , 1993 .

[203]  J. Laffont,et al.  Cartelization by regulation , 1993 .

[204]  W. Neu.  Allocative inefficiency properties of price-cap regulation , 1993 .

[205]  James D. Dana,et al.  The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries , 1993 .

[206]  R. R. Braeutigam.  A regulatory bargain for diversified enterprises , 1993 .

[207]  Catherine Liston,et al.  Price-cap versus rate-of-return regulation , 1993 .

[208]  Yeon-Koo Che.  Design competition through multidimensional auctions , 1993 .

[209]  J. Vickers.  Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation , 1993 .

[210]  J. Kwoka,et al.  Implementing price cops in telecommunications , 1993 .

[211]  John C. Panzar,et al.  Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return to Price-Cap Regulation , 1993 .

[212]  J. Laffont,et al.  A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation , 1993 .

[213]  D. Sappington,et al.  Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities , 1992 .

[214]  J. Laffont,et al.  Regulation by Duopoly , 1992 .

[215]  Thomas P. Lyon.  Regulation with "20-20 Hindsight": Least-Cost Rules and Variable Costs , 1992 .

[216]  Noisy observation in adverse selection models , 1992 .

[217]  David P. Baron,et al.  Information, Control, and Organizational Structure , 1992 .

[218]  James J. Anton,et al.  Coordination in Split Award Auctions , 1992 .

[219]  John G. Lynch,et al.  The measurement and encouragement of telephone service quality , 1992 .

[220]  Ellen M. Pint,et al.  Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation in a Stochastic-Cost Model , 1992 .

[221]  Daniel F. Spulber,et al.  Sequential-equilibrium investment by regulated firms , 1992 .

[222]  D. Sibley,et al.  Strategic Nonlinear Pricing under Price-Cap Regulation , 1992 .

[223]  D. Salant,et al.  Trigger Price Regulation , 1992 .

[224]  Anjan V. Thakor,et al.  Cooperation versus Competition in Agency , 1991 .

[225]  Tracy R. Lewis,et al.  Oversight of Long-Term Investment by Short-Lived Regulators , 1991 .

[226]  R. Isaac.  Price cap regulation: A case study of some pitfalls of implementation , 1991 .

[227]  Gerhard Clemenz,et al.  Optimal Price Cap Regulation , 1991 .

[228]  Daniel F. Spulber,et al.  The Capital Structure of Regulated Firms , 1991 .

[229]  Rudolf Kerschbamer.  Destroying the "Pretending" Equilibria in the Demski–Sappington–Spiller Model , 1991 .

[230]  Jean Tirole,et al.  Auction design and favoritism , 1991 .

[231]  Mark Armstrong,et al.  Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist , 1991 .

[232]  Thomas P. Lyon.  Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose"? , 1991 .

[233]  D. Demougin,et al.  Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability , 1991 .

[234]  Tracy R. Lewis,et al.  Incentives for Monitoring Quality , 1991 .

[235]  J. Vickers,et al.  Optimal Regulatory Lag under Price Cap Regulation , 1991 .

[236]  Abraham Hollander,et al.  Duopoly and quality standards , 1991 .

[237]  Karen L. Palmer,et al.  Diversification by Regulated Monopolies and Incentives for Cost-Reducing R&D , 1991 .

[238]  M. A. Crew,et al.  Diversification and Regulated Monopoly , 1991 .

[239]  John Kwoka.  Productivity and Price Caps in Telecommunications , 1991 .

[240]  W. Tye,et al.  The Duquesne Opinion: How Much "Hope" is There f6r Investors in Regulated Firms? , 1991 .

[241]  Jean Tirole,et al.  Privatization and Incentives , 1991 .

[242]  Jean Tirole,et al.  The Politics of Government Decision-Making : a Theory of Regulatory Capture , 1991 .

[243]  D. Sappington,et al.  Sequential regulatory oversight , 1990 .

[244]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts , 1990 .

[245]  D. Sibley,et al.  Regulating without Cost Information: Further Observations , 1990 .

[246]  T. Stefos.  Regulating without Cost Information: A Comment , 1990 .

[247]  Bernard Caillaud,et al.  Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information , 1990 .

[248]  J. Laffont,et al.  Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement , 1990 .

[249]  Joseph Farrell,et al.  Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay , 1990, Journal of Political Economy.

[250]  I. Vogelsang.  Optional two-part tariffs constrained by price caps , 1990 .

[251]  Daniel F. Spulber,et al.  Managing procurement auctions , 1990 .

[252]  P. Spiller.  Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed" , 1990, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[253]  J. Laffont,et al.  The Politics of Government Decision Making: Regulatory Institutions , 1990 .

[254]  Timothy J. Brennan,et al.  Cross-subsidization and cost misallocation by regulated monopolists , 1990 .

[255]  Jamie Hagerman.  Regulation by Price Adjustment , 1990 .

[256]  J. Laffont,et al.  Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming , 1990 .

[257]  Tracy R. Lewis,et al.  Countervailing incentives in agency problems , 1989 .

[258]  Mark A. Zupan,et al.  The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some Systematic Evidence , 1989, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[259]  R. R. Braeutigam,et al.  Price Level Regulation for Diversified Public Utilities , 1989 .

[260]  R. Prager.  Franchise bidding for natural monopoly: The case of cable television in Massachusetts , 1989 .

[261]  Luís M. B. Cabral,et al.  Incentives for cost reduction under price cap regulation , 1989 .

[262]  T. Brennan.  Regulating by capping prices , 1989 .

[263]  D. Sappington,et al.  An informational effect when regulated firms enter unregulated markets , 1989 .

[264]  Mark A. Zupan,et al.  Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically? , 1989 .

[265]  David S. Sibley,et al.  Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation , 1989 .

[266]  Richard Schmalensee,et al.  Good Regulatory Regimes , 1989 .

[267]  J. Panzar,et al.  Diversification incentives under "price-based" and ";cost-based" regulation , 1989 .

[268]  D. Sappington,et al.  Regulatory options and price-cap regulation , 1989 .

[269]  James J. Anton,et al.  Split-Awards Procurement and Innovation , 1989 .

[270]  Ronald R. Braeutigam,et al.  Optimal policies for natural monopolies , 1989 .

[271]  David P. Baron,et al.  Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions , 1989 .

[272]  I. Vogelsang.  Price Cap Regulation of Telecommunications Services: A Long-Run Approach , 1989 .

[273]  Tracy R. Lewis,et al.  Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems , 1989 .

[274]  John. Moore,et al.  Stopping agents from “cheating” , 1988 .

[275]  R. McAfee,et al.  Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design , 1988 .

[276]  James J. Anton,et al.  EXTERNAL MARKETS AND REGULATION , 1988 .

[277]  C. Price,et al.  The Economic Regulation of Private Industries by Price Constraints , 1988 .

[278]  J. Laffont,et al.  THE DYNAMICS OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS , 1988 .

[279]  I. Vogelsang.  A Little Paradox in the Design of Regulatory Mechanisms , 1988 .

[280]  David E. M. Sappington,et al.  Optimal contracts with public ex post information , 1988 .

[281]  Lawrence J. White,et al.  The Multiproduct Firm, Quality Choice, and Regulation , 1988 .

[282]  David E. M. Sappington,et al.  Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme , 1988 .

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