Did the High Court Reach an Economic Low in Verizon V. Fcc

The Supreme Court's decision in Verizon v. FCC rests on two errant interpretations of the 1996 Telecommunications Act: First, the Act represents a new form of regulation rather than a deregulatory statute; Second, Congress intended that the playing field be tilted in favor of new entrants. Under the Chevron Doctrine, deference is given to the controlling federal agency if there is a "rational connection" between the regulations and statutory intent. The Court ruled that the FCC's implementation of the Act survives that scrutiny. This discussion contests that finding and argues that the FCC's regulations undermine the goals of the Act.

[1]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Is there 'Hope' for price cap regulation? , 2002, Inf. Econ. Policy.

[2]  T. Tardiff.  Pricing Unbundled Network Elements and the FCC's TELRIC Rule: Economic and Modeling Issues , 2002 .

[3]  David E. M. Sappington,et al.  The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry , 2002 .

[4]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Strategic sharing in regulatory regimes , 2002 .

[5]  W. Baumol,et al.  The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors , 2001 .

[6]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Access pricing and exclusionary behavior , 2001 .

[7]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The “Costs” of Managed Competition , 2000 .

[8]  A. Kahn,et al.  Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation , 2000 .

[9]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The Political Economy of Price Cap Regulation , 2000 .

[10]  Dennis L. Weisman.  The (in)Efficiency of the “Efficient-Firm” Cost Standard , 2000 .

[11]  H. Trebing.  Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract , 2000 .

[12]  Dennis L. Weisman,et al.  The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of Its Implementation by the Feder , 1999 .

[13]  D. E. Sappington,et al.  Designing Incentive Regulation for the Telecommunications Industry , 1999 .

[14]  Marcelo Resende.  Productivity growth and regulation in U.S. local telephony , 1999 .

[15]  Sumit K. Majumdar,et al.  Incentive Regulation and Productive Efficiency in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry , 1997 .

[16]  Dennis L. Weisman.  Why less may be more under price-cap regulation , 1994 .

[17]  M. Lessnoff.  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy , 1979 .

[18]  P. Mcnulty,et al.  Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition , 1968 .

[19]  J. C. Bonbright.  Principles of Public Utility Rates , 1962 .

[20]  A. Kahn.  Whom the Gods Would Destroy or How Not to Deregulate , 2002 .

[21]  Larry L. Constantine,et al.  Back to the future , 2001, CACM.

[22]  W. Baumol,et al.  Parity pricing and its critics : necessary condition for efficiency in provision of bottleneck services to competitors , 1996 .

[23]  W. E. Taylor,et al.  The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Comment , 1994 .

[24]  A. Kahn,et al.  Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing , 1987 .

[25]  The economics of regulation , 1970 .