Strategic Investment in Renewable Energy Sources: The Effect of Supply Intermittency

To analyze incentives for investing in the capacity to generate renewable electricity, we model the trade-off between renewable (e.g. wind) and nonrenewable (e.g. natural gas) technology. Renewable technology has a higher investment cost and yields only an intermittent supply of electricity; nonrenewable technology is reliable and has lower investment cost but entails both fuel expenditures and carbon emission costs. With reference to existing electricity markets, we model several interrelated contexts|the vertically integrated electricity supplier, market competition, and partial market competition with long-term fixed-price contracts for renewable electricity|and examine the effect of carbon taxes on the cost and share of wind capacity in an energy portfolio. We find that the intermittency of renewable technologies drives the effectiveness of carbon pricing mechanisms, which suggests that charging more for emissions could unexpectedly discourage investment in renewables. We also show that market liberalization may reduce investment in renewable capacity while increasing the overall system's cost and emissions. Fixed-price contracts with renewable generators can mitigate these detrimental effects, but not without possibly creating other problems. In short: actions to reduce the intermittency of renewable sources may be more effective than carbon taxes alone at promoting investment in renewable generation capacity.

[1]  M. A. Crew,et al.  Peak Load Pricing with a Diverse Technology , 1976 .

[2]  Stefan Ambec,et al.  Electricity provision with intermittent sources of energy , 2012 .

[3]  Peng Sun,et al.  Efficient Feed-In-Tariff Policies for Renewable Energy Technologies , 2016, Oper. Res..

[4]  Karsten Neuhoff,et al.  Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction mechanisms to support wind power development , 2008 .

[5]  S. Borenstein The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster , 2002 .

[6]  Roman Kapuscinski,et al.  Curtailing Intermittent Generation in Electrical Systems , 2013, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[7]  A. Owen Environmental Externalities, Market Distortions and the Economics of Renewable Energy Technologies , 2004 .

[8]  Stephen F. Smith,et al.  Managing Wind-Based Electricity Generation in the Presence of Storage and Transmission Capacity , 2018 .

[9]  Sarang Deo,et al.  Cournot Competition Under Yield Uncertainty: The Case of the U.S. Influenza Vaccine Market , 2009, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[10]  S. Borenstein,et al.  The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry , 1997 .

[11]  R. Michaels Vertical Integration: The Economics that Electricity Forgot , 2004 .

[12]  Jan A. Van Mieghem,et al.  Commissioned Paper: Capacity Management, Investment, and Hedging: Review and Recent Developments , 2003, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[13]  Wedad Elmaghraby Multi-unit auctions with complementarities: Issues of efficiency in electricity auctions , 2005, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[14]  Christophe Defeuilley,et al.  Retail competition in electricity markets , 2009 .

[15]  Yimin Wang,et al.  On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing in Unreliable Newsvendor Networks , 2005, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[16]  M. Ventosa,et al.  Electricity market modeling trends , 2005 .

[17]  Özge Islegen,et al.  Carbon Capture by Fossil Fuel Power Plants: An Economic Analysis , 2009, Manag. Sci..

[18]  James Bushnell,et al.  Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets , 2005 .

[19]  Serguei Netessine,et al.  Electric Vehicles with a Battery Switching Station: Adoption and Environmental Impact , 2013, Manag. Sci..

[20]  Warren B. Powell,et al.  Optimal Energy Commitments with Storage and Intermittent Supply , 2011, Oper. Res..

[21]  Luk N. Van Wassenhove,et al.  Closed - Loop Supply Chain Models with Product Remanufacturing , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[22]  Erica L. Plambeck,et al.  Simple Relational Contracts to Motivate Capacity Investment: Price Only vs. Price and Quantity , 2007, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[23]  Edmond Baranes,et al.  Non-Renewable and Intermittent Renewable Energy Sources: Friends and Foes? , 2015 .

[24]  H. Chao Peak Load Pricing and Capacity Planning with Demand and Supply Uncertainty , 1983 .

[25]  Daniel T. Kaffine,et al.  Emissions Savings from Wind Power Generation in Texas , 2013 .

[26]  Jorge Barrera,et al.  Regulatory design and incentives for renewable energy , 2012 .

[27]  Pedro L. Marin,et al.  Capacity Choices in Liberalised Electricity Markets , 2009 .

[28]  Chitru S. Fernando,et al.  The theory of peak-load pricing: A survey , 1995 .

[29]  R. Green,et al.  Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.

[30]  Scott Kennedy,et al.  Wind power planning: assessing long-term costs and benefits , 2005 .

[31]  Munther A. Dahleh,et al.  On the value and price-responsiveness of ramp-constrained storage , 2013 .