Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda.

Abstract : THE EXPERIENCE IN Rwanda was a watershed for the international community, the United Nations, the contributors to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, and, least of all, myself. However, no one noticed that it was a watershed at the time. It was seen as too difficult and not of sufficient interest and value to prevent the outbreak of violence, and once violence had broken out, it still was not of sufficient interest to warrant the expense of resources and risk of more casualties to stop the violence from spreading. While others remained focused on the world's other crises, the people of Rwanda were forgotten. It was not really until the international community noticed tens of thousands of refugees in eastern Zaire, with thousands dying daily of cholera, that they felt truly compelled to act. This three-month delay cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent Rwandans, and countless scars and disfigurements for those who lived through the horrors. Like the crisis at the time, the need for a response mechanism and the consequences of not looking for solutions are guaranteeing the recurrence of other humanitarian catastrophes now and into the future.

[1]  F. Hampson,et al.  Making Peace Settlements Work , 1996 .

[2]  H. Howe Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping , 1996, International Security.

[3]  The international institute for strategic studies , 2000 .

[4]  C. Seiple The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, , 1996 .

[5]  J. Sweeney Stuck in Haiti , 1996 .

[6]  Astri Suhrke,et al.  Early warning and conflict management , 1996 .

[7]  Tony Smith In Defense of Intervention , 1994 .

[8]  Rubén P. Méndez Paying for Peace and Development , 1995 .

[9]  J. Herbst Responding to State Failure in Africa , 2011, International Security.

[10]  Gérard Prunier The Rwanda crisis : history of a genocide , 1996 .

[11]  F. Keane Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey , 1996 .

[12]  Young Persons Women in Agriculture Report of the Commissioners , 1868 .

[13]  D. Hamburg Education for Conflict Resolution. , 1994 .

[14]  Allan Little,et al.  Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation , 1997 .

[15]  J. Dethier The country study , 1989 .

[16]  C. Moskos Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force , 1976 .

[17]  J. Holl Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict : second progress report , 1996 .

[18]  African Rights Rwanda : death, despair and defiance , 1995 .

[19]  Antonio Tanca Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict , 1993 .

[20]  B. Boutros-Ghali The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996. , 1996 .

[21]  Stephen Goose,et al.  Arming Genocide in Rwanda , 1994 .

[22]  Thomas F. Keating,et al.  The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond , 1996 .

[23]  A. Kuperman The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes Do More Damage than Good , 1996 .

[24]  Richard K. Betts,et al.  The Delusion of Impartial Intervention , 1994 .

[25]  A. George,et al.  The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy , 1997 .

[26]  C. Larson The United Nations’ Department of Public Information , 1950 .

[27]  S. Metz DISASTER AND INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: LEARNING FROM RWANDA , 1994 .

[28]  Douglas E. Lute,et al.  Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies, The U.S. Experience , 1998 .

[29]  G. Clark,et al.  CHAPTER VII. ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION , 1966 .

[30]  J. Stremlau Sharpening international sanctions : toward a stronger role for the United Nations , 1996 .

[31]  John R. Oneal,et al.  Are the American People “Pretty Prudent”? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950–1988 , 1996 .