A proposal for a new accident analysis method and its application to a catastrophic railway accident in Japan

In a society of highly advanced technology, a new type of compound accident takes place. In an accident analysis, recent research concerns three aspects: human (M), technology (T) and organisation (O). However, technologies are developing day by day and it is becoming difficult to find causes of the recent compound accidents even with M, T and O analyses. This paper suggests further analyses considering the recent change of Western and Japanese societies quoting the recent catastrophic railway accident in Japan.

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