暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Elizabeth Pennisi,et al. How Did Cooperative Behavior Evolve? , 2005, Science.
[2] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Evolutionary dynamics on graphs , 2005, Nature.
[3] A. Neyman. Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1985 .
[4] B. Crespi. The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms. , 2001, Trends in ecology & evolution.
[5] D. Dewsbury,et al. The Principles of Learning and Behavior. , 1982 .
[6] K. Pienta,et al. Evolution of cooperation among tumor cells , 2006, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[7] C. Hauert,et al. Effects of increasing the number of players and memory size in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: a numerical approach , 1997, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.
[8] de Waal,et al. Primates--a natural heritage of conflict resolution. , 2000 .
[9] Drew Fudenberg,et al. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .
[10] Sitabhra Sinha,et al. Symmetry warrants rational cooperation by co-action in Social Dilemmas , 2015, Scientific Reports.
[11] M. Milinski,et al. Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat. , 1996, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[12] David F. Sally. Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas , 1995 .
[13] R. Axelrod,et al. The Further Evolution of Cooperation , 1988, Science.
[14] R. Trivers. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.
[15] M. Nowak,et al. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos , 1992, Nature.
[16] Wenying Shou,et al. Synthetic cooperation in engineered yeast populations , 2007, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[17] Helena Brummer-Korvenkontio,et al. On Backward Induction Paradox , 2002 .
[18] V. Sasidevan,et al. Strategy switches and co-action equilibria in a minority game , 2012, 1212.6601.
[19] P. Richerson,et al. The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups. , 1988, Journal of theoretical biology.
[20] J. Andreoni. Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? , 1995 .
[21] David M. Kreps,et al. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .
[22] A. Neyman. Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known , 1999 .
[23] M. Nowak,et al. Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection. , 2006, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[24] P. Kollock. SOCIAL DILEMMAS: The Anatomy of Cooperation , 1998 .
[25] J. Ledyard. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .
[26] M. Nowak. Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation , 2006, Science.
[27] M. Nowak,et al. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1993, Nature.
[28] M. Nowak,et al. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring , 1998, Nature.
[29] L. Felkins. The Social Dilemmas , 2015 .
[30] M. Vos,et al. Sociobiology of the myxobacteria. , 2009, Annual review of microbiology.
[31] W. Hamilton. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. , 1964, Journal of theoretical biology.